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In light of the reality that pricing algorithms allow commercial
actors to perform all phases of their price-fixing conspiracies without leaving behind trails of traditional incriminating evidence, the
scarcity of algorithmic cartels prosecutions is hardly surprising.
Given well-documented evidence that the authorities struggle in
their efforts to detect even conventional price-fixing cartels, it is
imperative to come up with new tools for detecting algorithmic
cartels, which have unprecedented potential to harm consumers if
left ignored. This Note investigates algorithmic capabilities to collude, as well as legal and technical challenges that governmental
authorities face in confronting such collusion. This Note then introduces two proposals to improve the detection of algorithmic cartels:
cartel screening and a whistleblower bounty program. The Note
argues that, although the optimal solution is to implement the
whistleblower bounty program and cartel screening together, it
would be more effective and efficient to launch the former before the
latter. Importantly, by implementing the whistleblower bounty
program before cartel screening, governmental authorities would
gain the expertise necessary to enforce antitrust laws without
impeding innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 2015, a former executive of an online art deco
retailer, David Topkins, became the first—and to this day, the last—
e-commerce seller that the Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “the
Department”) prosecuted for using algorithms to fix prices.1
Topkins pled guilty to raising and fixing prices of decorative posters, prints, and other wall hangings sold in the United States through
Amazon Marketplace.2 According to the charge, Topkins conspired
with other art deco sellers to eliminate or minimize any price differences among them.3 To implement the conspiracy, Topkins wrote
computer code on algorithm-based software that set prices according to this arrangement. Referring to the Topkins case, the DOJ
noted that, “We will not tolerate anticompetitive conduct, whether
it occurs in a smoke-filled room or over the Internet using complex
pricing algorithms.”4 In light of the Department’s expressed zeal to
combat price-fixing conspiracies, casual observers might wonder
why Topkins—involving relatively small retailers—is the only
algorithmic price-fixing scheme that has ever been prosecuted in the
United States.
This Note investigates this dearth of internet-based price-fixing
prosecutions and focuses on the newly emerging challenge of
detecting price-fixing schemes facilitated by algorithms, which this
Note refers to as “algorithmic cartels.” Although a number of scholars have examined antitrust challenges that pricing algorithms present, they have mainly focused on the legality of different types of
algorithms, proposing legal frameworks such as standards for

1

Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price
Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixingantitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace [https://perma.cc/DR4Y-V3HL] [hereinafter
Press Release, Dep’t of Just.].
2
Id. See E-Retailers Beware: DOJ Files First Criminal Prosecution for Online Price
Fixing, PERKINS COIE (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/eretailers-beware-doj-files-first-criminal-prosecution-for.html [https://perma.cc/5WUD8SES].
3
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 1.
4
Id.
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algorithmic regulations5 or means for outlawing algorithms that lead
to tacit collusion.6
While this Note recognizes new issues that tacit algorithmic collusion has raised, it instead focuses on the limited detection of algorithmic cartels that are already illegal under the current antitrust
framework. Such a choice of focus stems from the reality that the
authorities struggle in their efforts to detect even regular price-fixing
cartels; in fact, the DOJ is only aware of an estimated ten to seventeen percent of cartels currently active.7 How can we address new
challenges if we have not adequately handled the old ones? Given
this low rate of cartel detection, it is safe to assume that Topkins’
outlier status is not evidence of digital cartels’ nonexistence but a
testament to the difficulty of their detection.
Addressing the obscure nature of algorithmic cartels, this Note
analyzes two proposals to improve such cartels’ detection: (1)
screening for cartels and (2) a whistleblower bounty program. The
Note argues that, although the optimal solution is to implement the
whistleblower bounty program and cartel screening together, it
would be more effective and efficient to implement the former
before the latter. By creating the whistleblower bounty program before launching cartel screening, governmental authorities will be
5

See Ben Shneiderman, Algorithmic Accountability, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWuDgY8aHmU
[https://perma.cc/82NK-ZSA2]
(proposing to establish a “National Algorithm Safety Board” that would audit, monitor,
and license algorithms before firms are allowed to use them); see also Andrew Tutt, An
FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 91 (2017) (advocating for the launch of a new
regulatory agency—similar to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration).
6
See Joseph E. Harrington, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous
Artificial Agents, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 331, 350–54 (2018) (arguing that
algorithms that use a reward-punishment scheme—that involves firms rewarding their
rivals’ inflated prices by maintaining such prices and punishing their rivals’ deviation by
undercutting them on price—should be deemed illegal per se).
7
See Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 459 (2006)
(finding that the likelihood a cartel will be detected is less than ten percent); see also
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 655 (2004)
(stating that eighty percent of cartels in existence go undetected); Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Nov. 8, 2010, at 3, 9,
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1060
AntitrustSanctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD32-7YXP] (“The bulk of scholarly opinion is
consistent with the view that despite ever-increasing levels of corporate fines and longer
jail sentences, cartel activity is currently under-deterred.”).
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able to gain expertise in complex algorithmic features, which must
be understood in order to perform effective cartel screening.8
Because whistleblowers such as algorithms’ developers, programmers, and computer technicians monitor algorithms on a daily
basis, they are well-equipped to provide the authorities with
valuable information about algorithmic properties that lead to collusion. Over time, via the investigation of cases of algorithmic cartels
uncovered by whistleblowers, U.S. agencies will acquire the necessary expertise on this issue. This expertise, gained in practice, would
help the authorities eliminate the risk of targeting benign algorithms,
wasting resources, and potentially depressing innovation.
Part I of this Note gives a brief explanation of what pricing
algorithms actually are before presenting three scenarios where pricing algorithms can facilitate anticompetitive collusion. Part I also
analyzes the ability of U.S. antitrust law to deal with each of these
scenarios. The three scenarios include circumstances where (1)
competing firms9 use algorithms to implement price-fixing agreements; (2) firms unilaterally program their algorithms to follow their
rivals’ prices; and (3) firms unilaterally employ pricing algorithms
that learn on their own to collude. Part I examines Professor Michael
S. Gal’s argument that certain algorithmic features should give rise
to the inference of an anticompetitive agreement.10 Further, Part I
summarizes the results of the experimental studies that demonstrate
the low probability of successful cooperation between self-learning
algorithms that lack an explicit design feature to collude. Part I
concludes that, if such features have to be explicit, adopting Gal’s
proposal to consider certain algorithmic features as evidence from
which a price-fixing agreement can be inferred would enable courts
8

Ezrachi and Stucke propose to screen the digital markets for collusion. To better
understand what factors are indicative of algorithmic collusion and, therefore, worth
exploring further, Ezrachi and Stucke encourage enforcers to begin commissioning or
internally conducting experimental research of pricing algorithms. See Ariel Ezrachi &
Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1806 (2017).
9
When this Note refers to the term “firms,” it means entities or individuals that can set
the prices of their products, including corporations, limited liability companies (LLC), and
partnerships.
10
See Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 77
(2019).
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to address tacit agreements—orchestrated with algorithms’ help—
within the current antitrust framework. Certainly, to develop case
law as to what algorithmic features and circumstances surrounding
their adoption would amount to circumstantial evidence of a pricefixing conspiracy, the agencies have to first detect such cartels.
Part II of this Note presents the challenges of detecting algorithmic cartels and explores possible solutions to such challenges. Particularly, Part II examines a proposal that tasks U.S. agencies with
screening algorithms and digital markets to detect algorithmic cartels. Further, Part II identifies the passage of a whistleblower bounty
statute as a solution to improve cartel detection. Analyzing the two
solutions and determining that, ultimately, both are necessary, Part
III of this Note concludes that implementing the whistleblower
statute prior to cartel screening is the best course of action for U.S.
agencies to take.
I. ABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO ADDRESS ALGORITHMIC
COLLUSION
This Part of the Note examines three scenarios where pricing
algorithms can facilitate anticompetitive collusion.11 First, competing firms can use algorithms to implement explicit price-fixing
agreements.12 Second, firms may unilaterally instruct their algorithms to fix prices: for example, by using the same or similar algorithms as their competitors and feeding such algorithms the same
data.13 Third, firms can unilaterally employ self-learning algorithms.14 Programmed to maximize profits, these algorithms learn
on their own that collusion is the best way to accomplish their designated goal.15 However, before delving into the legal analysis of
each of the above scenarios, a brief explanation of what algorithms
actually are is warranted.

11
12
13
14
15

See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1782.
Id.
Id. at 1783.
Id.
Id. at 1783–84.
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A. What Is a Pricing Algorithm?
An algorithm is a sequence of rules that should be applied in
precise order to perform a certain task.16 We all use (non-automated)
algorithms in our daily lives: when we decide what time to leave the
house, we use data inputs like destination, desired time of arrival,
weather, and traffic conditions.17 Algorithmic computer codes do
the same: the algorithms of a web-mapping service such as Google
Maps perform tasks for individual users based on those users’ inputs
(destination) and a variety of online sources (weather or traffic conditions).18 Besides assisting consumers in solving day-to-day tasks,
algorithms are also used for pricing decisions.19 For example, ridesharing companies such as Uber and Lyft use algorithms to set prices
of car rides in real time based on the demand for rides and the supply
of drivers.20 Algorithms allow computers to solve complex problems, and recent achievements in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning have further developed algorithmic capabilities.21
Nowadays, algorithms can actually learn on their own.22
Algorithms can learn through examples (supervised learning)
where developers teach them with a training sample.23 To illustrate,
imagine that Target wants to discount women’s shirts it sells online;
a developer of Target’s algorithm can select a sample data set of
different types of shirts and classify the items with the buttons on
the left side as “women’s shirts on sale.”24 After the algorithm learns

16

Gal, supra note 10, at 77.
See id.
18
Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
309, 310 (2017).
19
Gal, supra note 10, at 80–81.
20
See Sheng Li & Claire Chunying Xie, Automated Pricing Algorithms and Collusion:
A Brave New World or Old Wine in New Bottles? 18 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2018).
21
ORG. ECON. CORP. DEV., Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the
Digital Age 9 (2017), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Algorithms-and-colllusioncompetition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf [https://perma.cc/C348-JD9H] [hereinafter
OECD].
22
Id.
23
Ai Deng, Litigation Practicean Antitrust Lawyer’s Guide to Machine Learning, 32
ANTITRUST ABA 82, 83 (2018).
24
See id.
17
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this classification feature, it can apply the same criteria to the rest of
Target’s clothes.25
Conversely, if Target wants to discount women’s shirts only if
Walmart does, Target can apply the second type of learning technique: learning through differences.26 This technique would involve
Target’s algorithm tracking online prices of Walmart for a period
until it can characterize certain pricing behavior of Walmart as the
“norm.”27 When Walmart deviates from that norm, the algorithm
will flag such abnormality.28
The third type of learning is learning through trial and error (reinforcement learning).29 Using this technique, the developer of Target’s algorithm would not provide the algorithm with any examples.30 Rather, the algorithm would act on its own by assessing its
decisions based on the outcomes and using the learned lessons to
make better decisions in the future.31 For example, programmed to
“maximize profits,” Target’s algorithm can learn, through trial and
error, that certain pricing decisions are more profitable than others;
via this “machine learning,” the algorithm is taught to employ the
best performing strategies in the future.32
This tremendous power and utility provided by pricing algorithms have brought enormous benefits to both businesses and consumers.33 Algorithms can personalize customers’ shopping experiences based on their past purchases, preferences, and demographic
information.34 Using algorithms, businesses can better identify
profit-maximization prices by analyzing historical sales perfor-

25

Id.
See id at 84.
27
See id. (explaining that the identification of anomaly is widely used in fraud
detection).
28
See id. For example, after an algorithm tracks a credit card user’s spending behavior,
the algorithms are able to characterize certain behavior as the “norm”; when the card is
used in a new geographic location, the algorithm will flag such transaction, raising a fraud
alert. Id.
29
Id. at 85.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Gal, supra note 10, at 78.
33
Id. at 78–79.
34
Id. at 80.
26
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mance data.35 Moreover, algorithms allow firms to offer more accurate market prices for products and services by balancing supply and
demand in real time.36 Such dynamic pricing enables firms to adjust
their prices as soon as new information—such as rival firms’ prices
or changes in sales and inventories—is received.37 For instance,
brick-and-mortar stores increasingly adapt dynamic pricing algorithms to match the latest offers from online competitors.38 Notably,
this trend correlates with the physical stores’ 4.2-percent increase in
2019 Black Friday sales compared to 2018, which suggests that dynamic pricing can save brick-and-mortar businesses from going extinct in light of the ever-growing and increasingly dominant online
retail sector.39
One fact is clear: humans cannot possibly collect, organize, and
analyze data as rapidly as algorithms do.40 As innovator Elon Musk
observed, “[a] computer can communicate at a trillion bits per second, but your thumb can maybe do . . . ten bits per second or a hundred if you’re being generous.”41 Giving these clear advantages of
pricing algorithms, it is not surprising that more and more firms employ them to make commercial decisions.42 Because pricing algorithms can be of economic advantage not only to businesses but also
consumers, the widespread use of these algorithms are here to stay.
Thus, it is imperative to find the optimal method to enhance the detection of algorithms that are used to carry out price-fixing conspiracies that harm consumers and violate antitrust law.

35

Harrington, supra note 6, at 353.
Li & Xie, supra note 20, at 1.
37
Harrington, supra note 6, at 353.
38
Li & Xie, supra note 20, at 1.
39
See Black Friday Brick-and-Mortar Sales Up 4.2% According to SpendTrend Data,
BUS. WIRE (Dec. 1, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20191201005183/en/Black-Friday-Brick-and-Mortar-Sales-4.2-SpendTrend-Data
[https://perma.cc/3PTE-87C8].
40
Harrington, supra note 6, at 353.
41
Steve Renick, Elon Musk at the World Government Summit 2017 in Dubai:
Conversation with Mohammad AlGerga, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2017), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=R5dHlLjOdjk [https://perma.cc/G4RQ-SJJN].
42
Gal, supra note 10, at 79.
36
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B. Scenario #1: Use of Algorithms to Implement Price-Fixing
Agreements
Algorithmic cartels—schemes that involve the firms’ use of
algorithms to implement their explicit price-fixing agreements—are
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.43 Section 1 is interpreted
as outlawing only unreasonable restraints of trade.44 The agreement
between two competitors to fix prices—whether to raise, depress, or
stabilize them—is per se illegal, even if unsuccessful.45 Under the
Supreme Court’s doctrine of per se illegality rather than the typical
“rule of reason” analysis, courts do not examine the anticompetitive
effects of such agreements.46 Rather, the per se rule operates as a
“conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”47
The use of algorithms as a tool to implement, monitor, police, or
strengthen an explicit price-fixing agreement among competitors by
using pre-loaded data and orders falls easily under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.48 Topkins illustrates such a scheme; there, Topkins
and other online art deco sellers used pricing algorithms as a tool to
eliminate any online price differences between these retailers.49
Similarly, in 2018, the European Commission (“Commission”)
fined Trod Limited and GB Eye over €111 million for fixing prices
using an algorithm.50 There, the parties agreed to fix online prices
on decorative picture frames and carried out their conspiracy using

43

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
44
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018).
45
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979).
46
Most restraints of trade are analyzed under the “rule of reason,” which “requires courts
to conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure . . . to assess
the [restraint]’s actual effect on competition.” Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
47
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
48
Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1787.
49
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 1.
50
Noel Beale & Sandra Mapara, Competition Law and Ecommerce: ‘It Wasn’t Me, It
Was the Algorithm!’, BURGES SALMON (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.burgessalmon.com/news-and-insight/legal-updates/competition-law-and-ecommerce-it-wasntme-it-was-the-algorithm [https://perma.cc/V8JB-T4QS].
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an algorithm that monitored and adjusted their prices to ensure that
they did not undercut each other.51
Another variation of the digital cartel scenario is a “hub-andspoke” scheme, where competitors (spokes) use a common pricing
algorithm (hub) to execute their price-fixing agreement.52 The
Meyer v. Kalanick case illustrates this variety of conspiracy.53
Alleging that Uber’s algorithm (hub) established inflated surge pricing, which drivers (spokes) charged while knowing that other Uber
drivers would not be undercutting that price, Spencer Mayer, an
Uber customer, filed a complaint against the massive ride-sharing
corporation and its then-CEO in the Southern District of New
York.54 Noting that “[a]utomation is effected through a human
design,” Judge Jed S. Rakoff found that Meyer’s allegations were
sufficient to withstand Uber’s motion to dismiss.55
Although Uber ultimately removed the case to arbitration,56 the
District Court reached its decision that the complaint contained sufficient allegations of a conspiracy by applying well-settled case law
interpreting the Sherman Act.57 The court explained that the drivers
had signed up for Uber with the understanding that they all were
agreeing to the same pricing determined by Uber’s algorithm.58
Judge Rakoff pointed out that if Uber drivers were working independently, it would have been against their own interest not to compete on prices.59 The court rejected Uber’s argument that its drivers,
who are independent contractors, had joined Uber’s platform in order to take advantage of its services rather than fix prices.60 As the
51

Id.
See generally Gal, supra note 10, at 105.
53
See generally Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
54
See id. at 819.
55
Id. at 826.
56
See generally Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
57
Sonia Kuester Pfaffenroth, Pricing Algorithms: The Antitrust Implications, ARNOLD
& PORTER (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/
2018/04/pricing-algorithms-the-antitrust-implications [https://perma.cc/34KE-3JPR].
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. The Luxembourg’s Competition Authority (LCA) also investigated the use of a
pricing algorithm to orchestrate a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Michele Giannino, Webtaxi:
The Luxembourg Competition Authority Exempts an Algorithmic Price-Fixing
Arrangement on Efficiency Grounds, CORE BLOG (July 10, 2018), https://coreblog.
52
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court’s analysis in Meyer demonstrates, the hub-and-spoke scheme
is not new to the antitrust community: competitors have been using
a common third party to coordinate their conspiracies long before
the emergence of algorithms.61 The then-head of the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) Maureen Ohlhausen suggested a simple test
that captures cases like Meyer and Topkins: “If it isn’t ok[ay] for a
guy named Bob to do it, then it probably isn’t ok[ay] for an algorithm to do it either.”62
C. Scenario #2: Unilateral Use of Algorithms to Achieve Parallel
Pricing
Rival firms’ unilateral adoption of algorithms to mirror each
other’s prices—thereby achieving equilibrium of inflated prices—is

lexxion.eu/webtaxi-the-luxembourg-competition-authority-exempts-an-algorithmic-pricefixing-arrangement-on-efficiency-grounds/ [https://perma.cc/WW5V-2CJT]. The case
involved a booking platform—Webtaxi—that used an algorithm to set nonnegotiable taxi
prices for all the participating drivers. Id. In 2018, although the LCA found the arrangement
to constitute a price-fixing agreement, the LCA exempted the arrangement due to the
efficiencies it generated, including lower prices to some customers and the reduction of
wait time. Id.
61
“[C]ourts have long recognized the existence of ‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracies in
which an entity at one level of the market structure, the ‘hub,’ coordinates an agreement
among competitors at a different level, the ‘spokes.’ These arrangements consist
of both vertical agreements between the hub and each spoke and a horizontal agreement
among the spokes to adhere to the [hub’s] terms, often because the spokes would not have
gone along with [the vertical agreements] except on the understanding that the other
[spokes] were agreeing to the same thing.” Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 824 (quoting
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226–27 (1939)). U.S. v. Apple Inc. is a
relatively recent case involving hub-and-spoke conspiracy. 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
To ensure that Amazon does not undercut Apple on e-book prices, Apple got publishers to
change their pricing arrangements with Amazon. The court found that Apple (hub)
conspired with the publishers (spokes) to raise the price of e-books in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Apple, 791 F.3d at 335. Although the court found the conspiracy
illegal per se, the court also held that the agreement would have been illegal even under
the rule of reason analysis. See id. Addressing Apple’s argument that the arrangement was
needed to bring iPad to market, the court refused to “score these hardware innovations as
procompetitive benefits of the agreement between Apple and the Publishers to raise
prices.” Id.
62
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Should We Fear the Things That Go Beep in the Night?
Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust Law and Algorithmic Pricing, FED.
TRADE COMM’N 10 (May 23, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1220893/ohlhausen_-_concurrences_5-23-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MVK7-QR24].

2020]

BOUNTY HUNTERS FOR ALGORITHMIC CARTELS

1271

known as parallel pricing strategy, or conscious parallelism, and is
legal under the current antitrust framework.63 Professors Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke refer to such a parallel pricing
scenario as the “Predictable Agent.”64 Parallel pricing typically occurs among rival firms in an oligopoly65 without any agreement
among the firms.66 In highly concentrated markets, “economists observe high interdependence and mutual self-awareness between
sellers, which makes parallel decision-making more likely.”67 Competitors independently mirror each other’s prices and come to a mutual tacit understanding that they all are better off in the long term
by maintaining inflated prices rather than engaging in a price war.68
This concern that oligopolies engaging in parallel pricing can
raise their prices above competitive levels is known as the “oligopoly problem.”69
Algorithmic parallel pricing can also occur where rival firms,
without any illegal communication, use the same third-party algorithm by electronically sending it their cost data, which leads to price
equilibrium.70 For example, if competing retailers contribute data to
the same third-party algorithm, that algorithm can determine that
parallel pricing is the best profit-maximizing strategy because stabilizing inflated prices increases profits for retailers and the algorithm’s vendor.71 Therefore, although rival retailers used the same
algorithm, they did not necessarily agree to fix their prices.72 The
Supreme Court “has never held that proof of parallel business
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See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1783.
Id. at 1783.
65
Oligopoly is “the market condition that exists when there are few sellers, as a result
of which they can greatly influence price and other market factors.” Oligopoly,
DICTIONARY, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/oligopoly [https://perma.cc/WB96Z99V].
66
See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790.
67
Kaylynn Noethlich, Artificially Intelligent and Free to Monopolize: A New Threat to
Competitive Markets Around the World, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 923, 927 (2019).
68
See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790.
69
Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the
Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 144–
45 (1993).
70
See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1783–84, 1788.
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See id. at 1783–84, 1787–88.
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See id. at 1783–84, 1788.
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behavior conclusively establishes an agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.”73
Independent conduct (when competitors act in parallel without
regard to one another’s actions) and interdependent conduct,
so-called conscious parallelism (when firms take into account how
other firms are expected to react), do not constitute “agreement.”74
Although the Supreme Court has ultimately declined to address
the oligopoly problem by deeming parallel pricing unlawful, the issue was highly debated.75 Professor and former Judge Richard A.
Posner once argued that the oligopoly problem could be addressed
by the Sherman Act.76 Posner explained that a concentrated market
structure and voluntary parallel pricing strategies—such as signaling and responding with prices—could permit an inference of
a tacit conspiracy.77 To the contrary, Professor Donald Turner argued that tacit coordination by an oligopoly should not be regarded
as “agreement” in violation of the Sherman Act.78 Turner warned
that courts would not be able to communicate a clear and effective
standard that would identify illegal conduct that must be enjoined
because it was unreasonable to expect firms to ignore the prices of
their rivals.79
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Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954).
Gal, supra note 10, at 99.
75
See id. at 99–100.
76
Id.
77
See generally Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1968). Posner’s approach to the oligopoly problem has
not prevailed in the courts, even in the opinion of Judge Posner. See DOUGLAS A. MELAMED
ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 202 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2018). Judge Posner commented that “it is not a violation of
antitrust law for a firm to raise its price, counting on its competitors to do likewise (but
without any communication with them on the subject) and fearing the consequences if they
do not.” Id.; see Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price
Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 766 (2014) (repudiating his earlier view); see also Gal,
supra note 10, at 100 (finding that Posner’s early view has recently been supported by
Harvard University Law Professor Louis Kaplow who argues that the distinction between
express collusion and conscious parallelism “does not serve social welfare” and the
definition of “agreement” should include both).
78
See generally Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
79
Gal, supra note 10, at 100; Baker, supra note 69, at 171.
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Courts have ultimately adopted the Turner practical approach
that focuses on identifying conduct that can sensibly be prohibited.80
As then-Judge Stephen Breyer stated, “[I]ndividual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its own decisions upon its belief
that competitors do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act . . . .”81 Supreme Court
Justice Breyer later explained that such reading of the Sherman Act
is not because “[parallel] pricing is desirable (it is not), but because
it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy
for ‘interdependent’ pricing.”82 Particularly, courts cannot reasonably order “a firm to set its prices without regard to the likely reactions of its competitors.”83
Accordingly, firms that unilaterally adopt pricing algorithms
and program them to follow the price increase of their competitors
do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act; under the law as
currently interpreted, the firms do not explicitly agree to anything.84
Each firm independently makes a decision, based on its self-interest,
to adopt a particular algorithm; and the adopted algorithm does not
“agree,” as is conventionally understood, to collude with other algorithms.85 Rather, each firm, like in a classic parallel-pricing
scenario, realizes on its own that the best profit-maximizing strategy
is to follow the price increase of others.86
D. Parallel Pricing with “Plus Factors”
Conscious parallelism—where firms code their algorithms to
look out for the opportunity to establish the interdependence
of prices without taking part in any concerted illegal action—
is perfectly legal.87 In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distributing Corp., the Supreme Court held that conscious parall80

Baker, supra note 69, at 171 (“This argument for deeming parallel pricing among
oligopolists a violation of § 1 was ultimately rejected by the antitrust mainstream, for the
reasons set forth in Donald Turner’s influential 1962 article on conscious parallelism.”).
81
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1791.
87
Id.
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elism is not equivalent to an illegal agreement; the Court further
stated that “[t]he crucial question is whether respondents’ conduct
toward petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express.”88 In a more recent decision, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court confirmed that “agreement” must involve either express or tacit (implicit) formulation.89
Thus, in parallel pricing cases, the focus is on identifying the
existence of a tacit agreement.90 As the term suggests, a tacit agreement refers to an agreement that is not explicitly expressed but
rather is implied or indicated.91 The Supreme Court has held that
business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which
the factfinder may infer “agreement.”92 For instance, in Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. U.S., decided in 1939, the Court inferred “agreement” where a firm communicated a proposed course of conduct to
its rivals as well as to customers and the conduct was subsequently
adopted by the industry with minor modifications.93 In affirming the
illegality of the arrangement, the Supreme Court reasoned that “an
unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.”94 The Court
further explained that acceptance of an invitation to participate in a
price-fixing conspiracy is sufficient to establish a violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.95 Seven years later, in American
Tobacco Co. v. U.S., the Court found the existence of an “agree-

88

Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41(1954)
(holding that distributors’ action violated Section 1 where distributors, knowing that
concerted action was contemplated and invited, gave their adherence to the scheme and
participated in it).
89
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
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Gal, supra note 10, at 105–06.
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Id.
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Id.
93
306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (finding “agreement” based on evidence that the distributors
met individually with the exhibitors and each distributor was aware that the others had
received identical letters proposing the new marketing procedures; but no evidence was
offered that distributors ever met to discuss the arrangement); accord United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (holding that, in order to find a
conspiracy, “[i]t is not necessary to find an express agreement” . . . [i]t is enough that a
concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement.”).
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Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226.
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Id.
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ment” where the parties’ actions could not be explained by their selfinterest, as their prices rose when costs declined.96 The subsequent
Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.—addressing minimum-resale price-maintenance conspiracy
allegations—noted that “[t]he correct standard is that there must be
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action
by the [parties].”97
The above-described Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates
two conceptual points of reference. First, the Court can find “agreement” even when coordination among firms lacks a direct exchange
of assurances. Second, the Court entertains the inference of “agreement” where circumstantial evidence suggests that parallel pricing
was more likely than not an outcome of concerted action. To assist
in separating conscious parallelism from a tacit agreement, lower
courts have endorsed the concept of “plus factors,” which refers to
circumstantial evidence that permits the inference of an actual
agreement as opposed to independent actions.98 Recognizing that “a
knowing wink [could] mean more than words,” the Ninth Circuit
gave an example of circumstances that would warrant the court to
submit the question regarding the existence of a conspiracy to a jury:
Let us suppose five competitors meet on several
occasions, discuss their problems, and one finally
states—‘I won’t fix prices with any of you, but here
is what I am going to do—put the price of my gidget
at X dollars; now you all do what you want’ . . . . All
leave and fix ‘their’ prices at ‘X’ dollars. We do not
say the foregoing illustration compels an inference in
this case that the competitors’ conduct constituted a
price-fixing conspiracy, including an agreement to so

96
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805 (1946). In markets free of
collusion, when costs of production decrease, it is against a firm’s self-interest to increase
the end-price of its product because the firm risks to lose its customers who would start
buying the same or similar product cheaper from other competing firms. See generally
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(Aug. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html
[https://perma.cc/PX2C-945H].
97
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
98
Gal, supra note 10, at 105–06.
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conspire, but neither can we say, as a matter of law,
that an inference of no agreement is compelled.99
Besides conduct that conveys mutual assurances, firms’ practices that facilitate coordination have also been deemed “plus
factors” in certain circumstances.100 As then-Judge Sotomayor
wrote, “in the absence of direct ‘smoking gun’ evidence, a horizontal price-fixing agreement may be inferred on the basis of conscious
parallelism, when such interdependent conduct is accompanied by
circumstantial evidence and plus factors such as defendants’ use of
facilitating practices.”101 Facilitating practices and circumstantial
evidence may include conspirators’ communication in person, via
emails, or via phone calls, and an indication that such communication was not conducted in the ordinary course of business.102 Thus,
under certain circumstances, courts treat the adoption of practices
that facilitate coordination as a “plus factor” that serves as an indirect indication of “agreement.”
E. Algorithmic Parallel Pricing Without Pro-Competitive
Justifications as a “Plus Factor”
Professor Michael S. Gal argues that certain circumstances surrounding the use of algorithms can be treated as “plus factors” that
establish the inference of “agreement” once parallel pricing is
proven.103 Gal suggests several situations where the use of algorithms should raise red flags and warrant further investigation of
their legality.104
In each of Gal’s contemplated scenarios, the firms engage in parallel pricing by using their algorithms in a non-optimal way, which
reveals collusion to onlookers.105 For instance, when competing
firms use similar algorithms, although superior algorithms are

99

Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965).
Gal, supra note 10, at 103–04.
101
Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.).
102
Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 187–89 (2d. Cir. 2012).
103
Gal, supra note 10, at 110, 179–80 (arguing that “given the shortcomings of existing
law in addressing algorithmic-facilitated coordination,” courts should “treat[] the adoption
of facilitating practices, by itself, as a basis for liability”).
104
Id. at 113–15.
105
Id. at 115.
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available to them, this suggests collusion.106 Furthermore, firms
might feed their algorithms similar data even though they can easily
access better data sources.107 Moreover, although better case studies
are available, the firms may train their algorithms with similar case
studies regardless.108 Finally, by making their algorithms easily observable to their competitors, firms can enable their algorithms to
signal to competitors how the firms will react to market conditions,
thereby communicating intent and commitment.109 According to
Gal, if such acts lead to parallel pricing, the authorities should investigate them further to make sure that these algorithms’ possible
beneficial effects do not tilt the balance toward their anticompetitive
outcomes.110 Given that it is often the case that algorithmic functions—such as gathering and analyzing data—create efficiencies
that reduce costs or increase the quality of production, they should
be allowed.111 However, other functions—such as making pricing
data transparent to everyone—may be used to enable coordination.112 Thus, it is important to analyze all these functions together
to see whether it is possible to achieve the benefits of the former
without the harm of the latter.113
Gal explains that an easy case would involve one firm rendering
its algorithms transparent only to its rivals, by, for example, encrypting its information so that only competitors can read it.114 Because
such discriminatory access clearly serves neither consumers nor the
firm acting unilaterally, the collusion is evident. Gal has also
hypothesized that even if a firm makes its algorithm transparent to
everybody, such action, depending on the circumstances, can still be
considered as a “plus factor” for facilitation of unlawful comm-unication.115 The relevant questions would be whether the transparency
benefits consumers and whether the firm otherwise has an interest
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 113.
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
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in preserving the content of its algorithm or the database as a trade
secret, as an answer in the negative to the former and in the affirmative to the latter would indicate that there is collusion with the
firm’s competitors.116
Gal’s proposed “plus factors” fit neatly into the current jurisprudence on tacit price-fixing agreements. These “plus factors” encompass the conceptual points established by the Supreme Court and
further developed by lower courts. First, all of the circumstances addressed by Gal involve firms that use their algorithms to communicate their intentions to act in a certain way and their reliance on others to follow in their steps.117 Second, the fact that the firms’ avoidable acts have no competitive rationale excludes the possibility that
they acted independently.118
F. Scenario #3: Unilateral Use of Self-Learning Pricing
Algorithms
The third scenario involves firms that unilaterally employ selflearning algorithms that establish price equilibrium after learning on
their own that it is the best profit-maximizing strategy. Ezrachi and
Stucke refer to this category of algorithms as “Digital Eye.”119 “Digital Eye” algorithms use “Deep Learning,” which is a highly sophisticated method of reinforcement learning that “mimic[s] the brain’s
cognitive and computational mechanisms.”120 A deep learning algorithm “processes raw data in a complex, fast, and accurate way . . .
and delivers an optimal output without revealing the relevant
features that were behind the decision process.”121 Accordingly,
firms that use deep learning algorithms can genuinely reach collusive outcomes without even knowing about it, which raises a challenging question of whether the authorities can impose any liability
on such firms.122
116
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See id. at 115.
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120
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Currently, collusion reached by self-learning algorithms is perfectly legal. Because courts concur that to find “agreement” in violation of the Sherman Act, “there must be some overt act of communication to create or sustain that mutual understanding,”123 firms that
collude by merely employing autonomous algorithms do not violate
Section 1.124 Absent a fundamental change in antitrust jurisprudence, it is very unlikely that even a well-elaborated argument—
e.g., that algorithms can “communicate the requisite mutual understanding” to collude in violation of the Sherman Act—can convince
the courts that algorithms, like humans, can reach an agreement to
fix prices.125 This view is supported by DOJ Antitrust Division officials, who maintain that “tacit collusion through [algorithms] . . . is
not illegal without an agreement among participants.”126 Yet, despite
their current legality, “self-learning algorithms can more easily determine the price that maximizes joint profits and which harms consumers the most.”127
In light of the potential threat that self-learning algorithms pose
to consumers, Professor Joseph E. Harrington proposes a change to
antitrust law.128 Harrington argues that the authorities should outlaw
pricing algorithms that use a reward–punishment scheme, which involves firms rewarding their rivals’ inflated prices by maintaining
such prices and punishing their rivals’ deviation by undercutting
them on price.129 Harrington contends that properties of learning algorithms that produce efficiencies—such as estimating supply and
demand, identifying most profitable price under given market conditions, swiftly adjusting to changes in market conditions, and personalizing prices for consumers—are not relevant to the establishment of a reward–punishment scheme that generates collusion.130
123
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Id. at 348.
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According to Harrington, since the properties of pricing algorithms
that generate efficiency are distinct from the features that
promote collusion, it is possible to identify a set of pricing
algorithms that should be illegal per se.131 Meanwhile, Harrington
also humbly admits that “[w]e know far too little about algorithmic
collusion . . . .”132
However, the fact that we know very little about algorithmic collusion, coupled with efficiencies generated by pricing algorithms
which benefit consumers, is precisely why it is very unlikely that
courts will entertain Harrington’s proposal of deeming certain algorithms per se illegal. From an antitrust policy standpoint, the U.S.
courts remain largely dedicated to the Chicago School of thinking
that gained mainstream prominence in the 1970s and 1980s.133 The
Chicago School philosophy focuses on efficiencies in the market
and consumer welfare (in the sense of harms and benefits to ultimate
consumers).134 Moreover, the Supreme Court, over the past forty
years, has been moving away from its application of the per se rule
because the rule “can . . . prohibit[] procompetitive conduct [that]
the antitrust laws should encourage.”135
131

Id.
Id. at 358.
133
See Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718–19, 720, 722
(2017) (arguing against the Chicago School approach to antitrust in the context of Section
2 of the Sherman Act that—unlike Section 1 that is concerned with concerted conduct
between rivals—addresses unilateral anticompetitive conduct). Khan explains that the
Chicago School’s view that “market power is always fleeting—and hence antitrust
enforcement rarely needed” does not reflect the true dynamics of a powerful online
platform, such as Amazon Marketplace, that can maintain its monopoly indefinitely due to
a strong network effect and Amazon’s ability to drive competitors out by engaging in
predatory pricing rather than competing on the merits. Id.
134
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Enforcement Is So Difficult to Bridge, 33 ANTITRUST ABA 113, 115 (2018).
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Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007); see
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the per se rule is observed only in cases that deal with antitrust issues arising out of parties’
unilateral anticompetitive conduct, such as unfair monopolization. See, e.g., Leegin, 551
U.S. at 907 (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
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522 U.S. 3, 7, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) and
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The possibility that collusion of self-learning algorithms will
lead to inflated prices has also generated an outcry among scholars
and practitioners for regulatory measures.136 Some observers argue
that governmental authorities should create new regulatory bodies
to oversee algorithms.137 For instance, Professor Ben Shneiderman
proposes to establish a “National Algorithm Safety Board” that
would audit, monitor, and license algorithms before firms are
allowed to use them.138 Attorney Andrew Tutt advocates for the
launch of a new regulatory agency— similar to the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration—which would attempt to “prevent the introduction of algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy
has been proven through evidence-based premarket trials.”139 It
should be noted that the SEC has already introduced efforts to
regulate algorithmic trading.140 While the assessment of the aforementioned regulatory measures is beyond the scope of this Note,
regardless of whether certain properties of self-learning algorithms
that lead to tacit collusion will ever be outlawed or regulated in
the future, authorities would still face the challenges of detecting
such collusion.
G. Addressing an Actual, Rather Than Theoretical, Threat of
Algorithmic Collusion
Empirically, we have not seen a case where algorithms, either
simply coded to maximize profits or explicitly programmed to
136
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(adopting a rule requiring “persons who are primarily responsible for the design,
development[,] or significant modifications of algorithmic trading strategies” to register
with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)).

1282

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:1259

collude, led to collusion.141 However, a number of experimental
studies have demonstrated that such algorithmic collusion is possible.142 In one study—that took several years to design—ten
researchers from nine universities across four continents examined
the behavior of twenty-five algorithms in a variety of contexts.143
The study found that all of the examined algorithms learned to
cooperate effectively.144 Nevertheless, the researchers emphasized a
number of technical challenges, such as algorithms’ diminished
ability to cooperate and elicit cooperation without prior knowledge
of the other algorithms’ behavior.145 These and other challenges
often led an algorithm to defect rather than to cooperate “even when
doing so would be beneficial to the algorithm’s long-term payoffs.”146 Moreover, most of the studies that have confirmed algorithmic capabilities to collude assumed an unchanging market environment: the rewards for algorithms and the environment in which
algorithms operated were typically fixed.147 In a real market environment, algorithmic cooperation can be significantly undermined
because demand uncertainty and other variabilities make it hard for
an algorithm to understand whether a lowering price is the result of
declining demand or a deviation by another algorithm.148
After examining a number of experimental studies, Professor Ai
Deng concluded that “to design an algorithm that has some
degree of a guaranteed success in eliciting tacit collusion, the
capability to collude most likely needs to be an explicit design feature.”149 If that is the case, and collusion is coded explicitly into the
algorithm, then agencies and courts can address this actual, rather
than theoretical, algorithmic collusion problem by adopting Gal’s
approach.150 Particularly, the authorities can consider Gal’s pro141
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posed “plus factors” from which an agreement to collude can be inferred.151 Because algorithmic parallel pricing has never been challenged in court, we have yet to see whether courts will consider
Gal’s proposed “plus factors” as evidence of a tacit agreement to fix
prices. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Gal’s “plus factors” fit
well into the body of established case law that permits the inference
of “agreement” from similar facilitating practices, albeit without an
algorithmic spin.152 There is no reason to suspect that such an algorithmic wrinkle would discourage the Supreme Court from applying
its well-established legal framework to the digital market economy.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apple Inc. v.
Pepper indicates that it will not tolerate firms’ attempts to evade antitrust claims by employing new arrangements in the digital markets.153 The Apple case addressed unilateral anticompetitive conduct, which is captured under Section Two of the Sherman Act.154
In Apple, purchasers of smartphone applications (“apps”) created by
independent developers claimed that Apple imposed inflated commissions on the developers who, in turn, were forced to set high
prices for their apps.155 In rejecting Apple’s argument that under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,156 purchasers of third-parties’ apps in the
App Store had no standing to sue Apple because app developers,
rather than Apple, set the retail price, the Court explained that “Apple’s theory would provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to
structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade
antitrust claims by consumers and thereby thwart effective antitrust
enforcement.”157 Conferring standing on the app purchasers, the
Court declined to “create an unprincipled and economically senseless distinction among monopolistic retailers, and furnish mono-
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polistic retailers with a how-to guide for evasion of the antitrust
laws.”158
The Court’s reasoning in Apple suggests that it would be unwilling to entertain claims that business behavior which has long been
regarded as indirect evidence of tacit “agreement” should not be
considered as unlawful collusion only because it is facilitated by algorithms. Otherwise, the firms would receive “a how-to guide” for
conspiring via algorithms to fix prices with immunity, the immunity
that the Court declined to provide in Apple.159 Ultimately, the only
way to find out whether courts would be willing to recognize certain
algorithmic features and the circumstances under which such features are adopted as “plus factors” that warrant an inference of
“agreement” is to actually litigate such cases. Therefore, this Note
focuses on solving the preliminary problem: helping authorities
detect algorithmic cartels so the government can bring cases challenging these cartels.
II. DETECTION OF ALGORITHMIC CARTELS
A. Challenges in Detecting Algorithmic Cartels
Algorithmic cartels are more challenging to detect than regular
price-fixing schemes in part because traditional structural and behavioral approaches to cartels’ screening can often be ineffective for
algorithmic cartel detection. Involving the identification of markets
and products that are vulnerable to collusion and cartel formation,160
the structural approach can easily miss the firms that—while being
outside of the traditional “oligopoly problem”—managed to create
algorithmic cartels due to data transparency in the digital world.161
158

Id. at 1524.
See id. at 1524–25.
160
“[I]t has been shown that structurally, cartel formation is more likely to exist where
there are fewer firms, more homogeneous products, and more stable demand.” Joseph E.
Harrington, Jr., Detecting Cartels 1 (JOHNS HOPKINS U., DEP’T OF ECON., Working Paper
No. 526, 2005), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/72037/1/504388991.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XDE4-VFMS].
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See OECD, supra note 21, at 21; see also Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 8, at 1790
(explaining that in the digital world, a basic condition for tacit collusion/conscious
parallelism is easily accomplished); Noethlich, supra note 67, at 952 (“All digital markets,
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Meanwhile, the behavioral approach that entails flagging business
conduct and market outcomes indicative of a cartel’s existence may
also prove ineffective because algorithms can help cartels eliminate
suspicious behavior (such as temporary price wars and sudden price
collapses at the end of cartels) that might have otherwise placed
them on the radar of the authorities.162 Furthermore, algorithms’
ability to stabilize a cartel enables its members to respond quickly
to an individual firm’s attempt to cheat on its fellow cartelists.163
Every cartel faces this so-called prisoner’s dilemma,164 which
entails the risk that its members will start deviating from the pricefixing scheme to gain market share.165 To illustrate, imagine that the
market price of a product is ten dollars and that a cartel’s members
all agree to charge an inflated price of twenty dollars.166 While the
parties are all better off complying with the agreement, it can be hard
for a cartelist to resist a powerful temptation to cheat and charge
fifteen dollars to increase its market share by winning over its competitors’ customers.167 Such temptation can be curtailed only by a
high probability that other members of the cartel will detect cheating

even those outside the traditional oligopoly problem,” are “vulnerable to vast manipulation
and anticompetitive outcomes.”).
162
See DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., SUMMARY OF THE
WORKSHOP ON CARTEL SCREENING IN THE DIGITAL ERA 3 (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2018)3/en/pdf
[http://perma.cc/WFF69TYW] [hereinafter DIRECTORATE].
163
Noethlich, supra note 67, at 933–34.
164
Id. at 933. The prisoner’s dilemma game theory illustrates self-destructive tendency
of cartels’ dynamics. Id. The game can be illustrated with two prisoners (A and B) who
have been charged with a crime. Melamed, supra note 77, at 214–215. Neither of them
knows whether the other would confess or keep silent because they are kept in separate
cells. Id. If prisoner A keeps quiet it will go free only if B stays silent as well; if A keeps
quiet while B confesses, A would get maximum sentence of 10 years; if A confesses while
B stays silent, A would get a reduced sentence; if both prisoners confess, they both get
reduction in their sentences. Id. Obviously A and B are better off not confessing, but, since
none of them knows what another would do, the safest bet is to confess. Id. The prisoner’s
dilemma demonstrates that individually rational behavior in the absence of coordination
leads to an outcome that is worse for each person. Id.
165
Noethlich, supra note 67, at 933–34.
166
See Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, The Implications of Algorithmic Pricing for
Coordinated Effects Analysis and Price Discrimination Markets in Antitrust Enforcement,
32 ANTITRUST ABA 75, 75 (2017).
167
Id.
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quickly and retaliate by lowering their prices.168 The more quickly
other members of the cartel respond to any deviation from the common plan, the less likely the cartelist would try to stray off course.169
Therein lies the value that algorithms bring to this context: they
enable firms not only respond to cheating faster but also with more
accuracy and less expenditure.170 With precision and speed unattainable by any human, algorithms process competitors’ prices, prowl
databases, analyze all collected information, and arrive at pricing
solutions within milliseconds.171 However, such speed in managing
algorithmic cartels heightens the detection problem for authorities,
as it can drastically eliminate the possibility that the cartels will ever
get on the radar of the authorities.
Moreover, the mere fact that algorithms can immediately flag
any deviation from a common scheme is likely to prevent cartel
members from any attempt to cheat in the first place.172 The ability
of algorithms to track and quickly flag cartel members’ price
changes eliminates a lack of trust among cartelists, which is often a
reason behind cartels’ demise.173 Algorithms, which are computer
programs after all, are not subject to human vices—such as fear, distrust, and greed—and can therefore render the effect of the cartel’s
prisoner’s dilemma obsolete; free of this dilemma, cartels can operate without ever being detected.174
Further, because the use of algorithms allows cartels to execute
their illegal schemes while leaving minimal evidence, it diminishes
the likelihood of detection.175 After agreeing to fix prices via algorithm, co-conspirators do not need to speak to their fellow cartelists

168

See id.
Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 7.2 (2010), http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4HFL-HR6A] (specifying that speed in identifying and responding to competitors’
strategic initiatives renders markets more vulnerable to coordinated conduct).
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McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 166, at 76.
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See supra Part I.A.
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Noethlich, supra note 67, at 934.
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Id.
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Id. at 941.
175
David J. Lynch, Policing the Digital Cartels, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/9de9fb80-cd23-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2
[https://perma.cc/5PM7-BJWN] (subscription required).
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ever again, either in person, on the phone, or via email.176 Rather,
the cartelists can conveniently rely on algorithms to perform all the
aspects of their price-fixing scheme without leaving behind trails of
traditional incriminating evidence.177 Critically, the evidence of an
illegal scheme that can be uncovered by examining an algorithm itself is not easy to access or analyze.178 There are two kinds of access
to algorithms’ codes that the authorities can gain: black box and
white box.179 Black box access does not allow the authorities to examine the code itself; it only provides access to the algorithm’s output.180 Meanwhile, white box access enables the authorities to examine the algorithmic code.181 However, companies may be unwilling to provide access to their codes due to potential infringement
exposure of their algorithmic trade secrets.182
Another challenge that can affect the authorities’ ability to discover evidence of price-fixing schemes by analyzing algorithms is
access to data used by algorithms.183 The importance of such access
is twofold: it allows the authorities to discern algorithmic decisionmaking and perform repeatability analysis.184 Repeatability is an
empirical-science tool that the authorities can use to verify whether
a specific outcome was, in fact, caused by the algorithm.185 Specifically, repeatability analyzes the “closeness of the agreement
between the results of successive measurements of the same measure and carried out under the same conditions of measurement.”186
In other words, the authorities, having procured the data used by a
suspect algorithm, can run this data under the same conditions on
176

Id.
Id.
178
Avigdor Gal, It’s a Feature, Not a Bug: On Learning Algorithms and What They
Teach Us, OECD 5–6 (June 2017) (unpublished note for the 127th meeting of OECD
Roundtable on Algorithms and Collusion).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
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Id. (explaining that algorithms’ “comparative advantage may not necessarily lie in the
‘science’ of the algorithm but rather in its ‘engineering,’ including the way the algorithm
is tuned and the methods that it uses for improved performance.”).
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the same algorithmic code (if available) or a similar publicly accessible algorithm in order to see whether it produces the same inflated
prices that sparked the authorities’ interest.187
While repeatability provides a “sanity check,” it still leaves the
authorities with questions regarding the actual decision-making of
the algorithm.188 Where algorithmic decision-making is exposed
through, for example, a decision tree that reveals the factors that an
algorithm used in reaching its decision,189 the authorities can determine whether the factors used raise antitrust concerns.190 For instance, the enforcers may be concerned with a gas station’s algorithm that uses the color of the flag of a neighboring gas station—
which may be a covert channel for collusion—as a factor for determining its gasoline prices.191 However, an algorithm’s use of traffic
and weather conditions to set gasoline prices would not raise antitrust concerns.192 Where such factors are unclear or an algorithm is
unavailable, the access to data used by an algorithm can enable the
authorities to use publicly available algorithms to re-create the outcomes yielded by the algorithm at issue and discern the factors it
used.193 Moreover, such an indirect exposure of real-world algorithmic decision-making requires familiarity with state-of-the-art algorithms.194 Certainly, the necessary know-how can be provided by
experts that the DOJ commonly hires to prove price-fixing conspiracies in courts.195 However, in order to open an investigation that
warrants hiring such experts, the DOJ has to detect suspicious algorithmic activities in the first place.
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Gal, supra note 10, at 115.
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(Nov.
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2016),
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B. Leniency Program Is Not a Panacea for Cartel Detection
The Leniency Program (“the Program”), first introduced in
1978, has become the backbone of the DOJ’s cartel detection and
enforcement.196 Today, the Program provides corporations and individuals that come forward with information about their cartels an
opportunity to avoid a criminal conviction and fines.197 To be qualified for leniency, an entity must (1) be the first among the cartel
members to come forward,198 (2) stop its own participation in the
cartel, (3) fully admit to its role in the conspiracy, (4) identify its coconspirators, (5) make restitution where possible,199 and (6) cooperate fully with the DOJ.200 If the Division has not already started its
own investigation into the reported cartel, leniency is automatic for
qualified companies and individuals.201 Additionally, leniency can
still be available after the commencement of the investigation if the
196

See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust
Div., Presentation at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime: The
Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades 2–3, (Feb. 25,
2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download [https://perma.cc/527K-KEYQ].
197
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the
Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters 1 (Nov. 18, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810001/download [https://perma.cc/435V-49RK]. For a
brief history of the Division’s Leniency Program, see Constance K. Robinson & Kilpatrick
Stockton, Get-Out-Of-Jail-Free Cards: Amnesty Developments in the United States and
Current Issues, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 29, 30–33 (2007).
198
See Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., Remarks at the
Georgetown Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: Prosecuting Antitrust
Crimes 5 (Sept. 20, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517741/download
[https://perma.cc/MPL5-45GM] (“Even if a company is too late to qualify for leniency, we
take early acceptance of responsibility and meaningful cooperation into account in
determining the appropriate consequences for offending corporations and their
executives.”).
199
The DOJ rarely seeks restitution in criminal antitrust cases because victims can obtain
treble damages through civil actions. Meegan Hollywood & Dave Rochelson, It Ain’t Over
Til It’s Over: Can Making Acpera Restitution Conditional Help Fill A Gap In The Law?,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2019, at 1, 2, https://www.competition
policyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CPI-Hollywood-Rochelson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JKD3-HS53] (subscription required).
200
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10, 1993),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/corporate-leniency-policy [https://perma.ccJXZ2-R6W8]; see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS 1–2 (Aug. 10, 1994),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0092.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83PA-7CL8].
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Hammond, supra note 196, at 2.
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DOJ does not have enough information that is likely to result in conviction.202
The Leniency Program has been extremely successful, resulting
in the detection and conviction of major international price-fixing
cartels, billions of dollars in fines, and incarceration of cartel members.203 Between 2005 and 2010, ninety percent of all fines recovered from cartels were tied to the participation of leniency applicants.204 More than half of the DOJ’s ongoing international cartel
investigations are initiated or otherwise advanced by information
from leniency applicants.205 The Leniency Program is an effective
tool in cartel detection because it destabilizes cartels by creating a
race among conspirators to the prosecutor’s door to be the first to
confess.206 Each cartelist knows that it can report others in exchange
for full immunity. Accordingly, a firm is left wondering whether it
can trust its fellow cartelists, who happen to be its business competitors, to look out for the firm’s best interests.207
Nevertheless, even with the Leniency Program in place, some
estimates suggest that the DOJ is only aware of approximately ten
to seventeen percent of price-fixing cartels currently active.208 For
instance, professors Peter G. Bryant and Edwin Eckard, using data
from 184 convictions secured by the Antitrust Division between
1961 and 1988, have estimated that the probability of cartel
detection is between thirteen and seventeen percent.209 Professors
Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier, and Renaud Legal found,
based on the data of eighty-six convictions handed down by the European Commission between 1969 and 2007, that the probability of
cartel detection is approximately thirteen percent.210 Because the
202
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findings are based on the data of detected cartels, “they only represent the probability of a cartel being detected conditional on that
cartel being detectable.”211 The actual probability of cartel
detection is unknown and likely to be even lower than the paltry
aforementioned estimates.212
Based on the low rate of cartel detection, it is safe to assume that
even with the Leniency Program in place, the vast majority of cartels
go unpunished. This reality speaks to certain key challenges facing
the Leniency Program. Most important among these is how even
cartelists that want to get out of their illegal schemes may forgo selfreporting for a number of reasons.213 First, the Leniency Program
does not provide immunity from criminal exposure beyond the Sherman Act.214 A corporation that engaged in fraud along with pricefixing would still be on the hook for its fraudulent actions.215 Second, after receiving leniency, a company remains exposed to civil
liability and the fines that come with it.216 Further, cooperation with
the DOJ, which can last for years, requires a significant investment
of time and resources.217 In fact, many observers argue that leniency
applications are slowing down because of the cost of obtaining
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of Justice.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters 7 (Jan. 26, 2017),
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liable for only single, rather than treble, damages in a civil follow-on action, if that amnesty
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leniency, which includes attorney fees, corporate time, and the reality that, in an expanding universe of jurisdictions, the U.S. leniency
applicants have to self-report in all the countries impacted by their
illegal scheme.218
Thus, even without the challenge of detecting algorithmic cartels, the Leniency Program, while undoubtedly effective to a limited
extent, is not a panacea even for the detection of regular cartels. The
Program will likely prove even less effective in combating algorithmic cartels in light of their ability to stabilize a cartel’s operations
by eliminating the prisoner’s dilemma.219
C. Solution #1: Screening for Algorithmic Cartels
Ezrachi and Stucke propose to screen the digital markets for collusion.220 According to these scholars, agencies may “evaluate computerized market environments” and—if prices become unresponsive to costs or more tightly clustered across companies—“require
companies to reveal the nature of their algorithms to ascertain
whether these algorithms create excessive transparency or lead
to interdependence.”221
To better understand what factors are indicative of algorithmic
collusion and, therefore, worth exploring further, Ezrachi and
Stucke encourage enforcers to begin commissioning or internally
conducting experimental research of pricing algorithms.222 As part
of such research, a regulatory agency would examine the available
pricing algorithms and run simulations in a collusion incubator.223
The agency could test which conditions, when included or excluded
from the incubator, would raise the likelihood and longevity of collusion.224 Ezrachi and Stucke admit that such an incubator is far
218

See id.
See supra Part II.A. As explained in Part II.A, every cartel faces the prisoner’s
dilemma, that entails the risk that its members will start deviating from the price-fixing
scheme to gain market share. The more quickly other members of the cartel respond to any
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algorithms enable firms to respond to cheating effectively and efficiently.
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from perfect because it is relatively static and will not reflect
changes in market dynamics over time and alteration to algorithms
through, for example, human intervention.225 Nevertheless, according to Ezrachi and Stucke, such experimental research will help
identify which algorithmic features raise red flags and warrant further investigation.226 Such selective intervention, Ezrachi and
Stucke argue, “may have more limited cost implications” than random screening and “may also limit the possible adverse effects on
innovation and investment, as it is only after tacit collusion is detected that the market is subjected to a monitoring exercise.”227
Professor Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and Managing Director at
Moody’s Investor Services, Albert D. Metz, go a step further by proposing that the authorities use algorithms to screen for digital cartels
and other collusive, anti-competitive practices.228 Abrantes-Metz
and Metz explain that the successful detection of digital collusion
requires prediction or classification functions that algorithms perform seamlessly, and which are the very same functions that make
algorithms so attractive to cartels in the first place.229 The pair
acknowledges that simply asking algorithms to identify illegal collusion would be hopeless because lawful tacit collusion can be virtually indistinguishable from unlawful explicit collusion.230 Nevertheless, according to them, enforcers can train algorithms to identify
prices that are either unresponsive to costs or tightly clustered across
rival firms.231 After such red flags are raised, economists and computational experts would further analyze the algorithms at issue and
data used by them.232 Abrantes-Metz and Metz emphasize the importance of economists in the process because “an empirical approach to cartel detection is not only a prediction or classification
problem: there is usually a testing component.”233 The pair explains
225
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that, for effective cartel detection, it is paramount to formulate a hypothesis to be tested: “how likely is it that the observed data were
generated from a collusive rather than a competitive dynamic?”234
As Abrantes-Metz and Metz note, economists have the necessary
expertise to perform statistical testing and make the determination
regarding the likelihood of one hypothesis over an alternate.235
To illustrate how economists can use algorithms to identify collusion, Abrantes-Metz and Metz provide an example of the work
that they performed “almost two decades ago . . . with [a] compliance department of [one] company.”236 Their task was “to identify
which managers [in the company] were colluding to boost [their]
performance evaluations.”237 The suspicion was that conspiring
managers had agreed to boost the scores they assigned among themselves while depressing the evaluations of others.238 Having the
anonymized evaluation scores and other relevant data, such as practice areas and locations, the economists used “a clustering algorithm
to run over all possible combinations to find groups which minimized differences within and maximized differences without . . . .”239 Ultimately, the economists “identified exactly the []
managers [that] were suspected of colluding and the year [they had]
started” to do so.240
The possibility of using algorithms to screen for collusion is also
addressed in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (“OECD”) report.241 According to the OECD, a
number of competition agencies have already reported using
algorithms to detect bid-rigging by screening for anomalies and
suspicious bidding patterns.242 For instance, algorithmic screening
enabled the Korea Fair Trade Commission to detect several
bid-rigging conspiracies.243 These efforts and successes point to the
234
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promise of screening as a solution to enhancing the detection of
algorithmic cartels.
D. Solution #2: Antitrust Bounty Statute
Given that the Leniency Program is hardly effective at detecting
conventional cartels, scholars and practitioners have been advocating for the passage of an antitrust whistleblower statute since long
before algorithmic cartels have emerged on the scene.244 Specifically, Robert Connolly and Kimberly Justice, former prosecutors at
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, have argued that a statute that provides antitrust whistleblowers with financial rewards (bounty) will
add an additional tool to help the Department detect cartels.245
Connolly and Justice explain that “the cartel whistleblower calculus currently is all trouble, no reward”: whistleblowers receive
neither bounty nor protection from employment retaliation.246 Even
if a potential whistleblower did not participate in a cartel, but learned
about its existence by, for example, overhearing conversations of
their coworkers, they may often decide to look the other way.247 Otherwise, they may face the risk of losing their job, spending their savings on attorney fees, and being blacklisted from the industry.248 If
low-level employees—following their superior’s orders—get
involved in a cartel’s activities, their decision to report the cartel
would involve additional hurdles of applying for leniency and cooperating with the DOJ.249 The fact that the Individual Leniency Policy
is almost never used suggests that rational individuals are more
likely to forgo reporting rather than exposing themselves to all of
244

See generally William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement:
Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 768–69 (2001) (arguing
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the aforementioned risks.250 Therefore, providing whistleblowers
with a bounty, according to Connolly and Justice, can mitigate the
risks that whistleblowers face and, ultimately, incentivize them to
come forward.251 Moreover, Connolly notes that the bounty statute
would not only improve the detection rate of cartels but would also
destabilize them.252 The mere possibility that a whistleblower is able
to receive a reward for reporting a cartel might destabilize the cartel
or prevent its formation in the first place.253
Proponents of an antitrust whistleblower statute point to the success of the nation’s most renowned whistleblower system: the False
Claims Act’s (“FCA”) whistleblower provision.254 The FCA imposes civil liability for anyone who knowingly defrauds the government and permits the DOJ to recover treble damages.255 The Act
includes a qui tam provision that allows whistleblowers, who are not
affiliated with the government, to file an action on behalf of the government.256 The FCA provides standing for individuals who have
direct and independent knowledge regarding fraudulent activities
and have voluntarily shared the information with the government
before filing an action.257 If the DOJ decides to intervene, the whistleblowers receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the
money the DOJ recovers.258 If the DOJ does not join and bring the
suit themselves, the whistleblowers are still free to proceed on their
own and collect between twenty-five and thirty percent of the
amount recovered.259 Furthermore, under the FCA, whistleblowers
enjoy protections against retaliation, including a private right of
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action.260 Since the mid-1980s, the government has recovered
$27.2 billion from claims brought by whistleblowers under
the FCA.261
Advocates of an antitrust bounty statute use the success of the
FCA qui tam provision as an exemplar that whistleblowing
works.262 However, there is a consensus that an antitrust whistleblower statute cannot be modeled after the FCA qui tam provision
because the “DOJ has the sole authority to prosecute federal criminal cases, so a private right of action in the criminal context would
conflict with this authority.”263 Because a private party cannot bring
a criminal claim on behalf of a government, Connolly and Justice
believe that an antitrust bounty statute should be similar to the one
that the SEC currently has.264
The SEC whistleblower program emerged after Congress passed
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“the Dodd–Frank Act”) in 2010.265 The SEC whistleblower provision provides an informant with a reward for disclosing violations,
such as insider trading and fraudulent reporting.266 The SEC rewards
program is triggered only in cases where the SEC’s monetary sanctions exceed $1 million.267 When this threshold is met, a whistleblower receives no less than ten percent and no more than thirty percent of a total recovery.268 However, to be eligible for a bounty, a
260
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whistleblower cannot be “convicted of a criminal violation related
to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower
otherwise could receive an award.”269 When determining the
amount of a bounty, the SEC considers the significance of the information shared, the degree of assistance provided by the informant,
and the importance of deterring the specific violation at issue.270
Besides a monetary award, the SEC whistleblower statute provides
informants with anti-retaliation protections, including anonymity
and a private right of action.271 The SEC whistleblower program has
been an undeniable success: from its inception to the end of Fiscal
Year 2019, 67 whistleblowers received approximately $387 million
for cooperating with the SEC.272 On the whole, whistleblowers’
tips have helped the SEC to recover more than $2 billion in
financial remedies.273
In spite of the SEC whistleblower program’s success, Congress
has failed to provide antitrust whistleblowers even with minimal job
retaliation protection.274 In 2011, the Government Accountability
Office issued a report (“the Report”) on Criminal Cartel Enforcement recommending that Congress enact protections for whistleblowers who report criminal antitrust violations.275 This Report emphasized the consensus among key stakeholders that whistleblowers
should be protected from retaliation.276 Although the Report noted
that some stakeholders believed that a whistleblower reward would
be an effective additional tool in detecting and destabilizing cartels,
the Report found that there was no consensus on the issue and that

269
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the DOJ was opposed to the idea.277 Relying on this Report, Senators
Chuck Grassley (Republican) and Patrick Leahy (Democrat) introduced the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (“the Act”) in
2012, which would have provided whistleblowers with protection
from workplace retaliation.278 The Senate unanimously passed similar versions of this legislation in 2013,279 2015,280 2017,281 and
2019.282 However, on all four occasions, the House failed to take up
the bill.283 In light of the Senate’s bipartisan support of the Act, observers patiently wait for the House to take up the bill.284 Meanwhile, because the Report documented the lack of consensus among
stakeholders—including the DOJ—regarding a whistleblower reward, this issue has never made it to the language of the Act.285
The DOJ’s main concern with a whistleblower reward statute
is that jurors will not perceive whistleblowers—who will be
rewarded from the successful prosecution of those they implicate—
as credible.286 The DOJ points out that, although leniency applicants
receive amnesty, their credibility is somewhat maintained because
they have to admit their criminal wrongdoing.287 The Antitrust Division notes that concerns regarding witness credibility are especially emphatic in the criminal context, where the government has
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.288 According to the Department, although ninety percent of the cartel enforcement cases
277
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are settled by plea agreements, in the ten percent of the cases that go
to trial, the Department virtually always utilizes the leniency applicants’ testimony.289 Also, the DOJ is concerned with the possibility
that a whistleblower reward can undermine companies’ internal
compliance programs.290
Connolly and Justice argue that all of the aforementioned
arguments “are really quite weak.”291 The pair points out that “it is
not logical to worry about the credibility of witnesses you would
otherwise not even know about absent a whistleblower statute.”292
Further, Connolly explains that an antitrust crime typically
involves many culpable actors and a whistleblower would generally
“get the ball rolling” and provide evidence that will turn other witnesses and allow the Department to obtain subpoenas and search
warrants.293 As to those rare cases that do go to trial, a whistleblower
who stands to receive a financial reward does not seem that much
less credible than a leniency applicant who testifies against other
cartel members to gain amnesty.294 Arguably, the fear of one’s loss
of liberty via incarceration is a stronger motivator than pecuniary
gain; therefore, there is an argument that bounty recipients might be
even more credible than leniency applicants in this context.
Also, while the concern that a whistleblower reward could
undermine companies’ internal compliance program “seems more
legitimate,” it can hardly be dispositive.295 Connolly and Justice
explain that the Division would still be able to approach a company
with a credible compliance program and seek to negotiate a leniency
application, i.e., so-called affirmative leniency.296 Alternatively,
a truly comprehensive compliance program can be taken into
consideration by the DOJ at the charging and sentencing stage.297
Furthermore, Connolly and Justice argue that if cartels are getting

289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297

See id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
Connolly & Justice, supra note 244, at 2.
Connolly, supra note 274.
Connolly & Justice, supra note 244, at 2.
Connolly, supra note 274.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2020]

BOUNTY HUNTERS FOR ALGORITHMIC CARTELS

1301

exposed by employees who decide to knock on the door of a prosecutor rather than a compliance officer, the balance of equities favors
detecting cartels and stopping damaging price-fixing schemes from
harming consumers.298
Other advocates for an antitrust bounty statute note that the statute can have a similar provision to the one contained in the Dodd–
Frank Act, which requires whistleblowers from public companies
with robust compliance programs to also report illegal conduct
internally without stripping the whistleblowers of their reward.299 In
fact, a key goal of the Dodd–Frank Act—which has largely been
achieved—was to use the SEC whistleblower system itself to incentivize the widespread adoption of robust compliance programs by
public corporations.300 This suggests that a strong internal compliance system will not be affected by a whistleblower bounty statute,
as the two aspects of the enforcement scheme work well together,
rather than being mutually exclusive.
Connolly and Justice also argue that a widespread concern that
a bounty statute will enable a mastermind cartel to receive a financial reward is detached from reality.301 They explain that an antitrust
bounty statute would include the provision, similar to the one the
SEC has, that denies a bounty for those who have been convicted
of a criminal violation that they themselves reported.302
Accordingly, to receive a bounty, every potential whistleblower
with some criminal exposure would first have to obtain immunity
under the Leniency Program.303 During the leniency negotiations,
the DOJ would decide whether an informant is eligible only for
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leniency, a whistleblower bounty, or for both.304 The necessity of
first seeking immunity would ensure that the Antitrust Division retains significant control over the decision whether a whistleblower
is eligible for a reward.305 Moreover, according to Connolly and Justice, a whistleblower bounty would be an amount to be
determined.306 Hence, the DOJ would be able to reduce a bounty
based on a whistleblower’s involvement in the cartel.307
Connolly and Justice argue that rewarding low-level employees—given the risks and expenses they face providing valuable information—is a reasonable exchange.308 Under conspiracy law,
low-level employees are liable for the actions of a cartel if they take
a single act in furtherance of the illegal scheme while aware of its
existence.309 Thus, salespeople who know that their company is involved in a price-fixing scheme are liable as conspirators if they prepare a single bid that is a part of the scheme.310 In fact, low-level
employees are usually the ones who communicate with
competitors, attend meetings, and oversee the implementation of the
cartel.311 An employee with such first-hand knowledge of the cartel’s inner workings can be an effective whistleblower, and the DOJ—according to Connolly and Justice—would still have plenty of
cartel members to prosecute.312
III. ASSESSING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: THE BEST SOLUTION IS TO
IMPLEMENT THE WHISTLEBLOWER BOUNTY PROGRAM BEFORE
CARTEL SCREENING
These solutions—cartel screening and the whistleblower bounty
program—are not mutually exclusive. Their implementation can enable the DOJ to target algorithmic cartels both proactively (with cartel screening) and reactively (with the whistleblower bounty
304
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program). Furthermore, both solutions can complement each other
and work in unison with the existing Leniency Program. After red
flags are raised by cartel screening, the DOJ’s investigation into a
particular firm may trigger either the firm’s leniency application or
a whistleblower coming forward with information necessary for
conviction. The Department would retain significant discretion in
deciding which of the two options are more appropriate, depending
on the culpability of actors involved, the timing of the disclosure,
and the likelihood of a successful conviction without cooperation
from leniency applicants or whistleblowers. Implementing both solutions, the antitrust authorities would be able to address the challenging task of detecting algorithmic and regular cartels. Although
the optimal solution is to implement cartel screening and the whistleblower bounty program together, it would be more effective and
efficient to implement the latter before the former.
Such an order of implementation would be cost-effective
because it can eliminate the need for Ezrachi and Stucke’s proposed
research program. This research—aimed at determining algorithmic
features and the digital markets environment that raise red flags—
would be necessary313 because traditional structural and behavioral
approaches to screening are inadequate for the effective detection of
algorithmic cartels.314 However, the whistleblower bounty program
can alleviate the need for this research because whistleblowers such
as algorithms’ developers, programmers, and computer technicians—who monitor algorithms on a daily basis—would be able
to provide the authorities with valuable insight into algorithmic
features that lead to collusion. Over time, by investigating cases of
algorithmic cartels uncovered by whistleblowers, governmental
agencies will acquire the necessary expertise on the issue. Because
such expertise would be gained in practice—accounting for the realtime market conditions—it will ensure more accuracy in these agencies’ decisions to bring a legal challenge and therefore would eliminate the risk of targeting benign algorithmic practices, depressing
innovation, and wasting resources.
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Because antitrust whistleblowers’ eligibility for a reward will be
conditioned on a successful conviction, there is a guarantee that the
costs of providing the reward will be offset by the criminal fines.315
Also, the whistleblower bounty program—which would generally
require the DOJ to sit back and wait for “smoking gun” evidence to
knock on the door—would not require extensive expenditure for its
implementation. Conversely, the launch of cartel screening would
entail substantial investment in Ezrachi and Stucke’s proposed research program. For the program to be effective, computer scientists, economists, and antitrust experts must work together, shadow
the industry’s algorithms, and run different variations of algorithms
in various simulated market conditions.316 All of this would be much
more costly than simply paying those with existing knowledge
to share it.
Furthermore, the screening itself can impose considerable costs
even if agencies use algorithms to screen for cartels. At the stage of
initial screening, after agencies’ algorithms identify industries’ algorithms that raise red flags, the authorities would be able to get
only the black box access to suspect algorithms (unless firms’
algorithmic codes are publicly accessible); therefore, the authorities
would only have access to the algorithms’ output and, if lucky, the
dataset used to generate it.317 To verify whether a specific outcome
was caused by suspect algorithms, the authorities would have to
invest in empirical scientists and economists to perform repeatability analyses.318 After repeatability analyses, the antitrust enforcers
would still have to investigate whether algorithmic decision-making
is indicative of cartel existence. If an algorithmic decision tree is not
readily available, the agencies would need to use publicly available
algorithms to recreate the outcomes yielded by the algorithm at issue
to discover the features it used.319 To do so, the agencies need to
have familiarity with state-of-the-art algorithms that can help them

315
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understand whether the algorithm’s decision-making took into account features that suggest the existence of a cartel.320 Yet, such
know-how and technologies are not currently accessible to the DOJ
or the FTC because the antitrust community is largely playing catchup on the technical aspects of algorithms.321 As described by the
former FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen, “[t]he innerworkings of
these tools are poorly understood by virtually everyone outside the
narrow circle of technical experts that directly work in the field.”322
Perhaps the biggest downside of implementing screening
before the whistleblower bounty program is the risk that the
authorities would be stuck wasting their time and resources on investigating benign cases of parallel pricing while letting disruptive
algorithmic cartels slip through the cracks. Meanwhile, whistleblowers, assumed to be reasonable people, would neither waste the
DOJ’s time nor risk perjuring themselves and facing criminal
charges by bringing frivolous claims unless they are confident in the
merits of their claims and the prospects of financial reward.
Another reason why the implementation of the whistleblower
bounty program is more urgent than cartel screening is the former’s
ability to serve as an effective counterforce against cartels’ use of
pricing algorithms to stabilize their operations. As Connolly notes,
a mere possibility that a single member of a cartel can provide actionable information and receive a reward would significantly destabilize the cartel.323 To the contrary, screening does not seem to
provide the effect of destabilization that strikes at the heart of the
cartel’s existence, i.e., the trust that it will not be exposed by its fellow cartelists or employees.324 The statement of fraud convict Sam
E. Antar, former Crazy Eddie CFO, is illustrative: “In the two decades I was deeply involved in the Crazy Eddie fraud, the only threat
[that] made us lose sleep at night was the possibility of a
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whistleblower blowing the lid on our crimes.”325 Although screening efforts would certainly place algorithmic cartels on guard, it is
unlikely that screening would either destabilize algorithmic cartels
or make companies forgo engaging in price-fixing schemes altogether. Rather, in light of the inherent obscurity of algorithms and
the complexities of analyzing them, companies would still use algorithms to fix prices: the firms would hope that they would not be
detected or that they would still be able to prevail in courts (since
the DOJ would only be able to present jurors with “plus factors”
from which a conspiracy can be inferred).326
While the use of algorithms to screen for cartels has already
proven fruitful,327 the success of the SEC whistleblower program
also suggests that a similar antitrust program would be effective in
cartel detection.328 A high probability of success of the antitrust
bounty statute is also supported by the recent work of the Antitrust
Division with a qui tam whistleblower program.329 In November
2018, the DOJ settled criminal ($82 million) and civil ($154 million)
antitrust and qui tam claims against SK Energy Co. Ltd., GS Caltex
Corporation, and Hanjin Transportation Co. Ltd.330 The qui tam
whistleblower uncovered the bid-rigging scheme that the defendants
orchestrated to secure military fuel-supply contracts from the government.331 The DOJ recovered both under the FCA for defrauding
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the government and under Section 4(A) of the Clayton Act,332 which
amended the Sherman Act to provide injured parties the right to collect their economic losses caused by the “anti-competitive effect” of
the defendants’ actions.333 The fact that it was the qui tam whistleblower who uncovered the scheme that would have otherwise gone
undetected illustrates the necessity of the antitrust bounty program.
The antitrust whistleblower statute is needed precisely because the
FCA’s qui tam action is unavailable in price-fixing schemes where
the private sector and consumers, rather than the government,
are damaged.334
Another example that illustrates the effectiveness of rewarding
whistleblowers for reporting violations of competition law is a cartel
whistleblower program in South Korea. South Korea introduced its
cartel whistleblower policy in 2002.335 The program has already led
to convictions that would not have otherwise occurred336; and in
early 2019, the program awarded the highest whistleblower reward
to date (690 million Won, which is approximately $587,000) to an
informant in a price-fixing case.337 Notably, the implementation of
the whistleblower program coincided with the trend towards improving South Korean companies’ internal compliance programs: an
increasing number of companies are now offering anonymous whistleblower hotlines.338 This trend suggests that whistleblowing
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improves the private sector’s internal compliance initiatives rather
than undermines them.
Finally, it should be noted that, while the DOJ seems to be
opposed to the whistleblower bounty statute, the rationale for such
opposition is so “weak” that it might be a pretext, hinting at the
DOJ’s caution in introducing any new tools to its Leniency Program
that, while not perfect, still works.339 If that is the case, the Department probably would also be opposed to the screening program if it
is formally proposed and considered. However, this aversion to
change is detached from reality because the whistleblower statute
would not even change the Leniency Program, but rather would
simply supply an additional tool to assist the DOJ in cartel detection
and prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Considering the low detection rate of cartels in general and the
inherent obscurity of algorithmic cartels in particular, it is not surprising that Topkins has been the only case involving algorithmic
price-fixing prosecuted to date in the United States.340 The increased
difficulty of detecting algorithmic cartels, as documented in this
Note, can be effectively addressed by adopting the whistleblower
and cartel screening programs. They can complement each other and
work in unison with the DOJ’s existing Leniency Program, thereby
increasing the detection rate of algorithmic cartels.
However, after analyzing the proposed solutions, it becomes
clear that governmental authorities should implement the whistleblower statute before they launch cartel screening. The value of this
order of implementation lies in whistleblowers’ ability to “educate”
the authorities about complex algorithmic features, which must be
understood to perform cartel screening.341 Because whistleblowers
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such as algorithms’ developers, programmers, and computer technicians monitor algorithms on a daily basis, they are well-equipped to
provide the authorities with valuable information about algorithmic
features that lead to collusion. Whistleblowers, presumptively reasonable people, would come forward only if they are confident that
their information would lead to a cartel detection and, therefore, a
financial reward. Accordingly, by investigating cases of algorithmic
cartels based on whistleblowers’ inside information, the authorities
would gain the expertise necessary to perform cartel screening accurately. Given the advantages that pricing algorithms have generated for businesses and consumers, it is essential to avoid the risk of
targeting benign algorithmic practices, which would undermine
technological development and the associated benefits that come
with it.342 The whistleblower bounty program can achieve this delicate task of enforcing antitrust laws without inhibiting innovation.
Moreover, the program is an effective and efficient way to begin
the “hunt” for algorithmic cartels. If properly advertised, the program can start yielding results immediately after its introduction by
incentivizing whistleblowers, who already are in possession of actionable information, to come forward. The program would not require extensive expenditures for its implementation; and, because a
bounty will be contingent on a successful conviction, there is a guarantee that the costs of providing a whistleblower reward will be offset by criminal fines. Furthermore, having an informant with
knowledge about the cartel would substantially eliminate the possibility that the authorities would be wasting their time and resources
investigating benign cases of parallel pricing. Finally, incentivizing
cartels’ insiders to blow the whistle will serve as an effective counterforce to cartels’ use of algorithms to stabilize their operations.
Given that cartels remain “the supreme evil of antitrust”343 and
algorithms are clearly going to be a large part of the world’s economy moving forward, it is imperative to come up with adequate
tools for detecting algorithmic cartels, which have unprecedented
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342
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potential to harm consumers. Arguably, tacit algorithmic collusion—reached by deep-learning algorithms—can present an even
greater threat to consumers. Because the firms that employ these
deep-learning algorithms can collude without even knowing it,
authorities face a challenging question of whether they can impose
any liability on such firms. While it is unclear whether agencies
should regulate such deep-learning algorithms, the government
should certainly continue to enforce the existing antitrust laws.
Whereas cartel screening is a desirable but out-of-reach regulatory
tool, the whistleblower bounty program can be implemented immediately. Because the whistleblower statute would enable the DOJ to
increase its detection rate of not only regular, but also algorithmic
cartels, the passage of such a statute—followed by the launch of cartel screening—is more urgent than ever for eliminating price-fixing
cartels. As price-fixing cartels employ new means such as advanced
algorithms to carry out their conspiracies, Congress’s and the DOJ’s
unwillingness to adopt new tools to fight such cartels is no
longer acceptable.

